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Between Liberalism and Theocracy
JOHN D. INAZU*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Our symposium conveners have focused us on "the relationship
between liberalism and Christianity and their influence on American
constitutionalism."' My objective is to complicate the relationship and
reorient the influence. The focus of my inquiry is the liberty of
conscience and its implications for navigating the relationship between
church and state.' By approaching these issues through the lens of
political theology (as distinct from either political or constitutional
theory), I hope to show that some of the most significant embodiments
of conscience in the American colonies can neither be squared with an
individualistic liberalism (as some on the left are prone to do) nor
appropriated in the service of arguments that collapse the distinction
between church and state (as some on the right are prone to do).
I have in mind the political practices of Roger Williams and William
Penn. Both are important figures in American political thought, both
were known to many of the Founders, and both have drawn increased
attention in recent scholarship.' Both were also deeply theological
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the symposium on Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Christianity held at
Campbell Law School on March 18, 2011. Thanks to Rob Vischer, Nathan Chapman,
Will Revere, Barry Shain, Joel Nichols, and Amin Aminfar for helpful conversations and
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to the editors of the Campbell
Law Review.
1. Symposium, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Christianity: Perspectives on the
Influence of Christianity on Classical Liberal Legal Thought, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 501
(2011).
2. There is, of course, no express "freedom of conscience" in the Constitution, but
scholars have increasingly focused on the influence of conscience on a number of
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON
GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE (2010); MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY

(2008);

NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM AND WHAT

(2005).
3. Williams, in particular, has been the focus of a spate of recent scholarship. See,

WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT

e.g.,

TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS
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thinkers-and their political practices cannot be given sense outside of
the theological narratives within which those practices arose.'
My engagement with Williams and Penn is not confined to their
arguments. Both men lived out their political practices in an era much
different than our own. For this reason, identifying the theological
context of Williams and Penn is only a first step. An equally important
objective of this Article is to frame the ongoing relevance of their
contributions. To this end, I link the theological politics of Williams
and Penn to two contemporary theologians, John Howard Yoder and
Stanley Hauerwas. I then suggest a way to connect the theological
insights of Yoder and Hauerwas back to Williams and Penn through the
work of constitutional scholar H. Jefferson Powell. This Article sketches
these connections as a roadmap to future work. It is offered as an
opening round of what I hope will evolve into an extended discussion
about the contributions of these five theological thinkers to our
understanding of religious freedom and the intersection of theology,
political theory, and law.

LIBERTY

(1998); JAMES CALVIN DAVIS,

CHRISTIAN

CONVICTION AND

PUBLIC

THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF ROGER WILLIAMS:

ETHICS (2004);

MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF

CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); MICHAEL

ANTHONY

LAWRENCE,

RADICALS

IN THEIR

OwN

TIME

(2011).

For a

favorable

characterization of the significance of Penn relative to Williams, see WILLIAM COMFORT,
WILLIAM PENN, 1644-1718: A TERCENTENARY ESTIMATE 170 (1944) ("Both [Williams and
Penn] contributed to the evolution of American institutions, but Penn had the
opportunity of writing on a clean slate those principles which have become the
foundations of our American democracy. Probably no one would contend that Williams'
writings can be compared, for either quantity or importance, with Penn's."); see also JOHN
WlTTE,

JR. AND JOEL A.

NICHOLS,

RELIGION

AND

THE

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

15-16 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter WITTE & NICHOLS] (discussing the
influence of both Williams and Penn).
4. 1 should be clear that my attention to Williams and Penn does not stem from any
supposed influence they may have had on the founding or on particular founders. To be
sure, Williams' writings were known by the Baptists Isaac Backus and John Leland. See
HALL, supra note 3. And a number of the Framers of the First Amendment were aware of
the significance of Penn's life and writings. But Williams and Penn are far more
significant today as iconic figures in American political thought than as historical figures
in American constitutionalism. That reality does not eliminate the need for careful
attention to history and context, but it shifts the locus of the inquiry to their histories
and contexts as the predicate to rendering their ideas intelligible.
EXPERIMENT
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WILLIAMS AND PENN THE THEOLOGIANS

History has not been kind to Roger Williams and William Penn: the
theological dimensions of their contributions to religious liberty are
often marginalized or misinterpreted.' That this has happened is not
entirely surprising. The liberty of conscience at the core of each of their
thought is easily construed as an individual matter for at least three
reasons: (1) much of the Protestant tradition from which they drew has
emphasized the conscience of the individual; (2) the Enlightenment
understanding of conscience evolved into an individualistic guarantee
that "lolver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign";' and (3) contemporary American rights discourse has
exacerbated both of these theological and liberal theoretical emphases.!
But as Robert Vischer has rightly noted, "the dictates of conscience are
defined, articulated, and lived out in relationship with others."' Vischer
elaborates:
Our consciences are shaped externally; our moral convictions have
sources, and our sense of self comes into relief through interaction with
others. By conveying my perception of reality's normative implications,
my conscience makes truth claims that possess authority over conductboth my own and the conduct of those who share, or come to share, my
perception. Conscience, by its very nature, connects a person to
something bigger than herself, not only because we form our moral
convictions through interactions with the world around us, but also
because we invest those convictions with real-world authority in ways
that are accessible, if not agreeable, to others. This is the relational
dimension of conscience. 9
5. The most egregious example in recent years is

MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF

EQUALITY (2008).
Nussbaum argues that Williams "nowhere alludes to [theological] beliefs in arguing for
liberty of conscience-nor should he, since it is his considered position that political
principles should not be based on sectarian religious views of any sort." Id. at 43. Her
claim is baffling in light of the corpus of Williams writings and settled historical
scholarship. On the latter, see, e.g., Leroy Moore, Roger Williams and the Historians,32
CHURCH HIST. 432 (1963) (critiquing, among other arguments, Louis Parrington's claim
that Williams was "primarily a political philosopher rather than a theologian").
6. JOHN STUART MIL., ON LIBERTY 81 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003)
(1859).
7. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
CONSCIENCE:

IN DEFENSE

OF AMERICA'S TRADITION

OF RELIGIOUS

DISCOURSE (1991).
8.

ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE

BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE

3 (2010).

9. Id.
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The theological framework of both Williams and Penn presupposes
a relational conscience that is situated in religious practice. This
relational dimension of conscience is not always explicit in their writing,
and it is particularly obscured by Williams's narrow orthodoxy.'o But
the comprehensive theological narratives of these two men make clear
that their primary objective for liberty of conscience was to create a
space for the church separate from the strictures of civil authority, not to
defend conscience for its own sake." Penn argued that religious liberty
meant "not only a mere liberty of Mind, in believing or
disbelieving . . . but [also] the Exercise of ourselves in a visible Way of
Worship."2 Williams similarly insisted that "to molest any person, Jew
or Gentile, for either professing doctrine, or practicing worship merely
religious or spiritual, it is to persecute him, and such a person (whatever
his doctrine or practice be, true or false) suffereth persecution for
conscience."" Conscience for Williams and Penn meant an embodied
practice of worship."
The protections of conscience also gave both men pause about too a
porous relationship between church and state. As many have noted and
10. John Winthrop apparently believed that Williams would refuse to worship with
anyone other than his wife. See EDMUND MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE
STATE 40 (2007). Morgan notes that "Winthrop's report may have exaggerated the extent
of Williams' exclusiveness, but Williams had clearly pushed the principle of separation to
the point where the church was threatened with extinction for lack of suitable members."
Id.
11. John Witte has distinguished between Enlightenment views and the "evangelical"
views of Williams and Penn. John Witte, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in
the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1995).
Enlightenment views were based "on the belief that a person is fundamentally an
individual being and that religion is primarily a matter of private reason and conscience
and only secondarily a matter of communal association and corporate confession." Id. at
384. In contrast, "[tihe chief concern of the evangelicals was theological, not political.
Having suffered for more than a century as a religious minority in colonial America, and
even longer in Europe, they sought a constitutional means to free all religion from the
fetters of the law, to relieve the church from the restrictions of the state." Id. at 383.
12. WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE ONCE MORE BRIEFLY
DEBATED AND DEFENDED (Kessinger Publ'g 2010) (1670).
13. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1664). As Leroy Moore
has suggested, Williams's principal concern for religious liberty was "that the state leave
the way clear for Christ to be Lord and God to be God." MOORE, supra note 5, at 444.
Moore notes that the point is "readily overlooked by the romantic historians, who read
natural-rights ideology into all that Williams said." Id.
14. Cf. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 3, at 45 (contending that the American
founders embraced the "organic tie between religious conscience and religious exercise"
and rejected the distinction between religious belief and religious action).
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more have forgotten, Williams invoked the metaphor of a wall of
separation long before Thomas Jefferson. 5 For Williams, the divide was
crudely simplistic: the first table of the Decalogue corresponded to the
realm of the church in which man related to God, and the second table
set forth the jurisdiction of the state in which man related to man.16
Penn expressed a similarly binary distinction: "God and Caesar divide
the man; faith and worship belong to God, civil obedience and tribute to
Caesar."" The problem, of course, is that these simplistic divisions
between the realms of church and state offer little practical guidance.
The weakness of Williams's separation principles is evident in his "Ship
of State" letter, which he wrote to disclaim the charge that he believed in
"an infinite liberty of conscience."" Williams endorsed the right of the
civil authority to punish those who "refuse to help, in person or purse,
towards the common charges or defense" and who "should preach or
write that there ought to be no commanders or officers, because all are
equal in Christ."" In these claims, he elevated the civil authority over
the religious beliefs and practices of Quakers like Penn. Yet Williams's
disquieting limitations in his "Ship of State" letter are a rare aberration to
the unity of thought expressed in his writings. Elsewhere, his defense of
religious expression is largely unqualified, despite his disdain for most of
the religious beliefs he encountered." In The Bloody Tenent, he asserted
that in "spiritual and divine" matters, ". . . the worship which a state

professes may be contradicted and preached against, and yet no breach

15. Williams wrote of a "wall of separation between the Garden of the Church and
the Wilderness of the world." ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON's LETTER EXAMINED AND
ANSWERED, reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (Perry Miller
ed., 2005). For Williams, the wall served to protect the church: God had broken down
the wall "and made his Garden a Wilderness" and in order "to restore his Garden and
Paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in peculiarly unto himself from the world."
Id.
16. Williams sought support for this distinction in the writings of Calvin and Beza
(questionable allies given their advocacy of the burning of Michael Servetus). 4 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 264.
17. EDWARD BEATTY, WILLIAM PENN AS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER 123 (1939).
18. Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1654) in 6 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 278.
19. Id. at 279.
20. Throughout his writings, Williams railed against the beliefs of Jews, Muslims,
Quakers, Catholics, Indians, and Anglicans.
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of civil peace. And if a breach follow, it is not made by such doctrines,
but by the boisterous and violent opposers of them."21
Penn at times cabined his defense of dissent to religious matters:
"[W]e have not defended any dissenters, whose quarrel or dissent is
rather civil and political, than religious and conscientious; for both we
really think unworthy of protection from the English government, who
seek the ruin of it."22 This reliance on the distinction between the
religious and the political led him to the same theoretical problems that
Williams encountered. Although Penn once wrote of Pennsylvania that
"the first fundamental of the government of my country" was "that every
person that does or shall reside therein shall have and enjoy the free
possession of his or her faith and exercise or worship towards God," he
conditioned his principle upon the requirement that "every such person
useth not this Christian liberty to licentiousness, that is to say, to speak
loosely and profanely of God, Christ, or religion, or to commit any evil
in their conversation."
Despite these limits to his thought, Penn made important advances
in rooting conscience in social practice. Nowhere was this more evident
than in his defense of the freedom of assembly.24 Penn made clear the
communal nature of Quaker gatherings: "For any to say, our Meetings
are not Religious, is not only a poor Evasion but great Incharity; for that
is properly a Religious Assembly where persons are congregated with a
real Purpose of worshiping God, by Prayer, or otherwise . . . ." In
1670, Penn was arrested and tried for unlawful assembly stemming from

21. 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 96.

Williams's views of

religious expression could only have been heightened by the hastening of his banishment
in 1636 after complaints were "made to the Court that he would not refrain, in his own
house, from uttering his opinions." Reuben A. Guild, A Biographical Introduction to the
Writings of Roger Williams, in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 28. Eight

years later, Parliament ordered the burning of The Bloody Tenent. EDwIN S. GAUSTAD,
ROGER WILLIAMS 100 (2005).
22. WILLIAM PENN,

THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN

119 (Andrew R.

Murphy ed., 2001) [hereinafter PENN, POLITICAL WRITINGS].

23. BEATTY, supra note 17, at 160. As Edward Beatty has observed, this view "did not
guarantee freedom of religion for atheists, nor did it contemplate free speech for those
who lacked proper respect for the Christian faith or doctrine." Id. Penn nevertheless
grew increasingly nearer to the position that "truth can and must be found by free
inquiry and debate." Hugh Barbour, William Penn, Model of Protestant Liberalism, in 48
CHURCH HIST. 164 (1979).

24. For the broader constitutional connections between assembly and social practice,
seeJohn D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REv. 565 (2010).
25. PENN, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 22, at 118.
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a sermon that he delivered to fellow Quakers on Gracechurch Street in
London. 26 Responding to the charges against him, Penn proclaimed:
We confess our selves to be so far from recanting, or declining to
vindicate the Assembling of our selves, to Preach, Pray, or Worship the
Eternal, Holy, Just God, that we declare to all the World, that we do
believe it to be our indispensable Duty, to meet incessantly upon so
Good an Account; nor shall all the Powers upon Earth be able to divert
us from Reverencing and Adoring our God, who made us.27
Penn's words and actions were not soon forgotten in Old or New
England. When Congressman Sedgwick questioned the value of a right
of assembly during the House debates over the language of the Bill of
Rights, Congressman Page silenced him with a reference to Penn's trial
for unlawful assembly, a reference that Irving Brant characterized as the
"equivalent to half an hour of oratory" before the First Congress. Yet
despite his prominent defense of the inherently communal act of
assembly, Penn, like Williams, is remembered today mostly as a
defender of individual religious liberty."
Contrary to the individualistic gloss cast upon Williams and Penn,
both men were theological thinkers whose vision of the state
presupposed the existence and continued witness of the church. Their
attention to liberty of conscience arose out of a Christian particularity
that viewed the church as a body of believers rather than a collection of
individuals. The modern individualistic gloss on conscience would have
sounded foreign to their ears. Williams and Penn also viewed their
religious practices as central to all aspects of their lives. They would
have rejected the distinction between "public" and "private" that
underlies much of contemporary liberalism. In contemporary parlance,
they would have rejected the Rawlsian prioritization of the right over the
good and insisted upon an inseparable connection between their
"comprehensive doctrines" and their political practices.3 0

26. See Inazu, supra note 24, at 575-76.
27. WILLIAM PENN, THE PEOPLE'S ANCIENT AND JUST LIBERTIES ASSERTED, reprinted in
PENN, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 22, at 9-10.
28. Inazu, supra note 24, at 575.
29. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 5284: Honorary United States Citizenship
for William and Hannah Penn (Nov. 28, 1984) (recognizing the Penns as among "a small
number of men and women whose contributions to [this Nation's] traditions of freedom,
justice, and individual rights have accorded them a special place of honor in our hearts
and minds").
30. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993). For one critique of the Rawlsian move to prioritize the right over the good, see
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And yet Williams and Penn also maintained a distinction between
church and state. Theirs was not a theocraticvision. Williams and Penn,
after all, were the state. If their theological vision had been theocratic,
then their attention to conscience and separation would have been either
an incoherent sideshow or an irrational hedging of bets (a futile attempt
to prevent those who came after them from changing the rules). To be
sure, both Williams and Penn imposed some limits on liberty of
conscience that we would rightly reject today. But those limits are better
seen as imperfect manifestations of freedom of conscience than
deliberate attempts at theocracy-Williams and Penn left far too much
room for dissenting practices to be labeled as theocrats. In this respect,
their concern for liberty of conscience distances them not only from
today's secular liberals but also from religious believers who ignore or
diminish the protections of conscience for those outside of the church.
Consider, for example, some segments of the evangelical right who
advocate a return to a historically implausible "Christian America."32
opposition
to Rawlsian ontology does not align with "conservative" and "liberal" labels. See, e.g.,
MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1998). Importantly,

JASON C. BIVINS, THE FRACTURE OF GOOD ORDER: CHRISTIAN ANTILIBERALISM AND THE
CHALLENGE To AMERICAN POLITICS (2003). Religious believers who accept liberalism's
premise of privatized religion pose far less of a threat to liberal political theory. See
Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 25, 1984,
at 32 ("Our public morality, then-the moral standards we maintain for everyone, not
just the ones we insist on in our private lives-depends on a consensus view of right and
wrong. The values derived from religious belief will not-and should not-be accepted
as part of the public morality unless they are shared by the pluralistic community at
large, by consensus."). This is not to say that these religious believers never dissent on
discrete policy matters. Religious believers of all kinds oppose government policies
about capital punishment, decisions to engage in war, and other issues. But believers
who accept the premises of contemporary liberalism generally challenge government
policies from a position that accepts and often legitimates the fundamental authority of
the state. See Stephen L. Carter, Liberalism's Religion Problems, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2002,
at 21, 35. ("The conflict with liberal theory ... is posed not by those faith traditions that
surrender to the pull of the world but by those that struggle against it, exercising their
power of resistance.").
31. While much of what Williams and Penn wrote on conscience and separation
preceded their political rule, their later writings and political practices generally
reinforced their earlier claims.
32. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
RELIGION (1996); TIM LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS (1987); JERRY FALWELL,
LISTEN, AMERICA! (1980). For a critique of these approaches, see MARK A. NOLL, NATHAN

0.

HATCH,

& GEORGE M.

in STANLEY HAUERWAS,
LIVING IN BETWEEN

MARSDEN, THE SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA

17 (1983), quoted

CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON CHURCH, WORLD, AND

185 n.1 (1988) [hereinafter HAUERWAS,
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Among other things, these believers argue for a return of prayer in
public schools, the posting of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms,
and the display of nativity scenes on public property.3 3 Too often, they
provide an insufficient account of liberty of conscience for those outside
of the church. But not all believers seek to clothe the naked public
square. Some aim only to endure the offense of its nakedness."
III. BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

Williams and Penn sought to endure rather than to dominate.
While they would have rejected the compartmentalization of faith
demanded by contemporary liberalism, they would also have recoiled at
the efforts of some contemporary religious believers to tether a kind of
religious orthodoxy to the power of the state. They represented a kind
of political theology that not only prioritized the witness of the church
over the pretensions of the state but also sought to keep the two distinct
from one another.
This kind of political theology has been captured more recently by
the Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder. Like Williams and Penn,
Yoder sees the state and the rights that it grants as parasitic to the
existence of the church:
The enlightenment notion of the morally autonomous individual citizen,
bearer of 'inalienable rights,' is a later secular translation of the previous
century's puritan conviction that the rights are God's. For the puritan, it
is not because the individual is reliable but because God's word must be
heard that there must be freedom to assemble, to preach, to print, and to
read.

("[A] careful study of the facts of history shows that early America does not deserve to be
considered uniquely, distinctively or even predominantly Christian, if we mean by the
word 'Christian' a state of society reflecting the ideals presented in Scripture. There is no
lost golden age to which American Christians may return.")
33. One example of these efforts is playing out in debates over public school
curriculum in Texas (which, based on the size of its educational system, sets the
textbook market for much of the rest of the country). See Russell Shorto, How Christian
Were the Founders?, N.Y. TIMESMAG., Feb. 11, 2010.
34. The reference is, of course, to RICHARDJOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE:
RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1986).

35. John H. Yoder, Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen, 7 J. L. &
RELIGION 417 (1989) [hereinafter Yoder, Amateur Historian]. Yoder elaborated this view

in notes published by Thomas Shaffer: "[wihat Milton was fighting for is freedom of
press, assembly. [It] [wlas not individual nor individualistic. The stake was the glory of
God and the Sovereignty of the Word." THOMAS SHAFFER, MORAL MEMORANDA FROM JOHN
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According to Yoder, "[there was a long British Puritan history, from the
age of Milton to the 1689 Bill of Rights, in the course of which the civil
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly arose out of religious agitation,
not the other way round."3 He links these continued developments in
the American colonies to Williams and Penn. Yoder sees both men as
concerned first and foremost with "the authenticity of free Christian
allegiance."" He cites them as exemplars of the view that "the alternative
to buying into the power game according to its rules is to begin a new
game."3 ' And for Yoder, the story of Williams and Penn "give[s] the lie
to those who claim that dissent is necessarily linked to social withdrawal
or anarchism."*

HOWARD YODER 102 (2002). Yoder elsewhere develops three aspects of Puritan thought
that differ from Enlightenment notions: (1) Puritan proclamation made a canonical claim
in which "the Puritan case for the freedoms of speech and assembly appealed to the
sovereignty of the Word of God"; (2) Puritan proclamation assumed a congregational
structure which "brought forth an alternative social location and an original social shape
for the truth-finding process"; and (3) "Puritan proclamation was ecumenical in the sense
of recognizing no provincial boundaries, relativizing the clan and the nation, and thereby
the state." JOHN HOWARD YODER, FOR THE NATIONS: ESSAYS EVANGELICAL AND PUBLIC 20
(1997) [hereinafter YODER, FOR THE NATIONS].
36. Yoder, Amateur Historian,supra note 35, at 416-17. Cf. Michael McConnell, The
Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) ("[Tlhe struggle for the
freedom to publish religious tracts was a precursor to the struggle for the freedom of the
press more generally, as the freedom to gather together for purposes of religious worship
was for the freedom of assembly.").
37. YODER, FOR THE NATIONS, supra note 35, at 20.
38. JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM: SOCIAL ETHICS AS GOSPEL 187
(1984) [hereinafter YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM].
39. Id. at 180.
40. Yoder, Amateur Historian, supra note 35, at 422. In Yoder's view, "it was the free
churchmen Roger Williams and William Penn who-no less practical for being guided
more by their churchman's experience of the faith community than by England's
experience of royal authority-were first not only to envisage but also to create a
commonwealth with religious freedom." YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM, supra note 38,

at 180-81. In similarly laudatory language, Yoder writes that "[rloughly contemporary
with that 'glorious revolution' the Quaker William Penn was founding a colony with a
statutory commitment to religious liberty, democracy, and the rights of Indians. Before
him, a century before the Enlightenment and two and a half before Max Weber and Ernst
Troeltsch, Roger Williams gave the lie to the legend that people without armies or people
called 'sectarian' by their persecutors cannot shape society." JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE
ROYAL

PRIESTHOOD:

ESSAYs

ECCLESIOLOGICAL

AND

ECUMENICAL

135-36

(Michael

Cartwright, ed., 1994).
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Yoder's reliance on Williams and Penn is complicated by the fact
that both colonial leaders were able to "begin a new game"" by claiming
a new territory and establishing a new civil authority. That option no
longer exists-the church today always confronts the state and its laws.
But this present reality also reinforces the relational dimension of
conscience rooted in social practice. As Yoder recognizes, the church
exists as a communal, decision-making body that bears witness through
its collective action and voice. It is not a collection of individuals but a
political body. Yoder insists that while today "the application of the
term political to the state rather than to the church is so well established
that it cannot be combated . . . in biblical thought the church is properly

a political entity, a polis.13 Similarly, the ekklesia of the New Testament
"did not mean what church means in modern usage: it meant parliament
or town meeting, a gathering in which serious business can be done in
the name of the kingdom."" For believers like Yoder, that church will
never be the state but it will always be political.
Yoder's insights have been appropriated more recently by the
theologian Stanley Hauerwas." Like Yoder, Hauerwas seeks neither to
41. YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM, supra note 38, at 180.
42. My use of the terms "politics" and "political" to describe the church follows Yoder
and Stanley Hauerwas. James Davison Hunter has recently criticized Hauerwas for using
the terminology: "The use of the language of politics is a bid to translate social
marginality into social relevance. The problem is that this language comes with all sorts
of baggage and it cannot rid itself of this baggage." JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, To CHANGE
THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN

163 (2010). 1 find Hunter's critique misguided. Critical theorists have long
challenged the state's monopoly on the meaning of "politics" in ways that are helpful to
stimulating political imagination; there is good reason for arguments rooted in political
theology to do the same.
43. JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE CHRISTIAN WITNESS TO THE STATE 17-18 (2002).
44. YODER, FOR THE NATIONS, supra note 35, at 186-87. There is a rich politicaltheological meaning to assembly (ekklesia). See BERND WANNENWETSCH, POLITICAL
WORSHIP: ETHICS FOR CHRISTIAN CITIZENS 138 (Margaret Kohl, trans., 2004) (explaining
WORLD

that the Christian use of ekhlesia "had a distinctly political colouring"); WAYNE A. MEEKS,
THE FIRST URBAN

CHRISTIANS: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE APOSTLE PAUL 108

(1983)

(explaining that the first Christians "seemled] early on to have been using [ekklesial in a

peculiar way that must have been puzzling to any ordinary Greek" because the term
"name[d] not just the occasional gathering, but the group itself'); SHELDON S. WOLIN,
POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 96
(2004) (stating that the ekklesia viewed itself "as a polity, over other political entities").
45. Although Hauerwas is not read widely by political theorists or legal scholars, he
has arguably "articulated the most coherent and influential political theology in and for
the North American context." R. R. Reno, Stanley Hauerwas, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO POLITICAL THEOLOGY 302 (Peter Scott & William Cavanaugh, eds., 2004).
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control legal institutions to impose his own religiously informed
conception of the good nor to withdraw from society.46 Hauerwas insists
that the church occupies a political space that is neither privatized nor
subsumed by the state:
When "Christianity" becomes separable from the social form in which it
is to be embodied, two things happen: one, Christian belief gets located
in an interior, asocial sphere, "the heart" or "conscience" or some other
private (i.e., non-public) space, and this degenerates into "mere belief';
and two, in consequence of the first, a "public" space is cleared away for
a counterfeit form of "religion" to emerge that is said to be "common"

and thus become "the religion of the nation." What gets obscured in this
arrangement is the possibility of a Christianity the material form of
which is located neither in a private space nor in a general public space,
but the body of believers, in the church.
Hauerwas argues that the church is a "contrast model" against the liberal
practices that underlie the authority of the state. 8 His conception of the

church is inherently dissenting: "Learning to speak as a Christian is to
acquire habits that will put me at odds with the world."4 ' He insists that
the church has ontological primacy over the state: "[w]ithout the church
the world would have no history."o It is from this starting point, "from
the life of the church, past, present, and future, that [Christians] even
come to understand the nature of politics and have a norm by which all

Jeffrey Stout calls Hauerwas "the most prolific and influential theologian now working in
the United States," and suggests that "[t]he more thoroughly Rawlsian our law schools
and ethics centers become, the more radically Hauerwasian the theological schools
become." JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 75, 140 (2004).
46. While Hauerwas challenges the notion "that the only option for Christians is
either complete involvement in culture or complete withdrawal," HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN
EXISTENCE TODAY, supra note 32, at 11, he is often called "sectarian." For a summary of
these characterizations, and Hauerwas's repeated denial of them see STOUT, supra note 45,
at 140-61.
47. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom of
"Belief' is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 107, 119-20 (1992).
48. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 84 (1981) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER].
49. STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, WHERE RESIDENT ALIENS LIVE:
EXERCISES FOR CHRISTIAN PRACTICE 78 (1996).
50. HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY, supra note 32, at 61. This is "the most
determinative realist claim Christians can possibly make." Id.
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other politics can be judged."" These provocative claims do not shy
from controversy, but neither are they theocratic claims.
For all of his insights that shape his understanding of the church,
Hauerwas offers a thin account of the state. He might say that he has no
need for such an account, but to this extent, he diverges from Williams
and Penn (and Yoder, to the extent that Yoder relies on Williams and
Penn). In fairness to Hauerwas, it is wrong to suggest that he dismisses
any vision for the state. For example, he has written that "[w]hat is
required for Christians is not withdrawal but a sense of selective service
and the ability to set priorities."5 And in an early essay coauthored with
Thomas Shaffer, Hauerwas praised the iconic Thomas More as an
example "of those who wield power but who try to live truthfully."" But
Hauerwas remains at odds with legal institutions when he claims that
"Christians must withdraw their support" from any form of government
and society that "resorts to violence in order to maintain internal order
and external security."5 This aversion to the state and its legal apparatus
matters in the constitutional context that frames the questions of this
symposium. Religious believers who want to engage with constitutional
protections need constitutional arguments, and Hauerwas cannot get
them there.5 6 But we can move closer to the intersection of political
51.

HAUERWAS, COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER,

supra note 48, at 2.

52. Hauerwas contrasts his work to that of theologian John Milbank. See STANLEY
OF
THE
PRACTICE
AND
BONHOEFFER
THE
FAITH:
PERFORMING
HAUERWAS,
NONVIOLENCE 217 n.4 (2004) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH] ("The most

profound difference has to do with why I think enduring is so important for how
Christians are to learn to live in the world as we find it. Milbank wants Christians to
win . . . I think at best we should want Christians to endure."). See JOHN MILBANK,
THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASON (2006), for Milbank's seminal
work.
53. HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY, supra note 32, at 15; see also id. at 11
("The issue is how the church can provide the interpretive categories to help Christians
better understand the positive and negative aspects of their societies and guide their
subsequent selective participation.").
54. Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 569, 583 (1979). Hauerwas and Shaffer also argue that "the most
elementary hope that law has" is that "analysis and knowledge will go a long way toward
containing power." Id. at 578.
55. HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY, supra note 32, at 15; see also STOUT,
supra note 45, at 148 (making a similar critique of Hauerwas).
56. An interesting question is whether Hauerwas' aversion to liberal
constitutionalism renders him a de facto sectarian, notwithstanding his protests to the
At a minimum, Hauerwas differs from those who advocate complete
contrary.
withdrawal because he directs some of his arguments toward interlocutors outside of his
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theology and constitutionalism (and the antecedent political practices of
Williams and Penn) by turning to the work of constitutional law scholar
H. Jefferson Powell."
Powell shares both Hauerwas's wariness toward liberalism and his
recognition that violence underlies the functions of the state." In fact,
he sharpens Hauerwas's critiques by injecting Robert Cover's important
insights about the violence inherent in the law." He adopts Cover's view
that:
[O]ne of the primary functions of American courts is "jurispathic": by
declaring the "imperial" nomos of the nation, judges (attempt to) kill or
destroy the contrary nomoi of subnational, ethnic, and religious groups.
A system of constitutional rights, grounded upon the basis of the will of
the people, is necessarily intolerant, even in its enforcement of a liberal
tolerance.60
Powell differs from Hauerwas in his openness toward constitutional
practices that limit (but do not eliminate) the state's jurispathic
tendencies. He hints at this openness in his 1993 book, The Moral
Tradition of American Constitutionalism: "An authentically theological
approach to social criticism does not require the avoidance of all
nontheological methods any more than a theological critique of
cosmology must eschew quantum mechanics. Theology by itself does
not generate all of the tools necessary to engage in many theological
tasks."' He is more explicit in an essay eight years later, arguing that

community. See HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH, supra note 52, at 232 n.33 (2004) ("I
wish those who constantly accuse me of 'sectarianism' might from time to time ask
themselves why they are so angry about what I say. If I have 'withdrawn' from 'public'
debates surely I am not worth the time they spend in attacking me."). But cf. STANLEY
HAUERWAS, A BETTER HOPE: RESOURCES FOR A CHURCH CONFRONTING CAPITALISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND POSTMODERNITY 24 (2000) ("I have never sought to justify Christian
withdrawal from social and political involvement; I have just wanted us to be involved as
Christians.").
57. The move from Hauerwas to Powell is unsurprising: Hauerwas supervised
Powell's doctoral studies, and the two share many of the same philosophical and
theological influences.
58. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 91 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001);
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 269-70
(1993) [hereinafter POWELL, MORAL TRADITION].
59. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986); Robert Cover,
Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
60. POWELL, MORAL TRADITION, supra note 58, at 273.
61. Id. at 266.
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Christians may have "good theological reasons to support the legal
enforcement of certain individual rights as a strategy for protecting and
While the
promoting the temporal peace of American society.""
American obsession for individual rights is cause for concern, "the
language of individual rights is at the same time the most effective
means-often the only effective means-of raising questions about
social justice and social peace."6 ' As Powell argues:
For all the questionable decisions American courts have made in
elaborating the current constitutional law of individual rights, the overall
effect of much of that law has been "to promote the well-being of the
common people" by imposing procedural and substantive restraints on
the government's use of violence, by imposing significant limitations on
government's ability to exclude identifiable groups from equal treatment,
and by prohibiting most governmental interference with criticism of
government.64
Unlike Hauerwas the theologian, Powell the lawyer participates in
shaping these rights. 5 He does not "underwrite uncritical Christian
support for the American legal system,"66 but he envisions an active
engagement with democratic practices and wants "to suggest ways in
which Christians involved in the constitutional order (as lawyers, school
board members, voters, or victims) can rightly respond to the demands
and the pretensions of [American constitutionalism]."67 As he notes, the
purpose of this engagement is to limit the hold of the democratic process
62. Powell, supra note 58, at 86. Powell makes this argument within an Augustinian
framework. See also JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS 21
(1995) (explaining that Christians "can use the political order because it introduces
regularity into social relations and thus helps to make possible the life of the Church");
ERIC GREGORY, POLITICS AND THE ORDER OF LovE: AN AUGUSTINIAN ETHIC OF DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENSHIP 381 (2008) (explaining that the church can "use liberal politics along the
way to enjoying the politics of an infinite God").
63. Id. Powell offers a qualified endorsement of the value of the language of
"individual rights." He is highly critical of excessive "rights talk" and shows little
patience for the "American selfishness" to which it leads. Id. at 84 ("The constant refrain
'it's my right' undermines efforts to promote a sense of loyalty to society. Most
fundamentally, the American fetish of individual rights reinforces and furthers the
tendencies to selfish and antisocial behavior that underlie and warp American society.").
64. Id. at 86.
65. On this point, it is important to note that Powell has served in both the federal
and state governments, as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General and as principal Deputy
Solicitor General in the United States Department of Justice, and as Special Counsel to
the Attorney General of North Carolina.
66. POWELL, MORAL TRADITION, supra note 58, at 8.
67. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2011

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6

606

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:591

on other communities: "[tihe ultimate goal of the positive case for
democracy . . . is actually to reduce the sphere in which the coercive

power of the democratic process holds sway by strengthening the voices
of disagreement and dissent that can challenge the exercise of
dominion."' In a critique that could be leveled at Hauerwas, Powell
writes that "[a] blanket refusal to employ the linguistic and institutional
resources of constitutionalism .

.

. ignores the real (if limited) possibility

of using constitutional argument to enhance the ability of the victim and
the outsider to be heard."'
Powell's emphasis on "the victim and the outsider" links his
theology to his constitutionalism. It also brings us one step closer to
Williams and Penn. The "right of dissent that Christian experience and
reflection has shown to be theologically mandated"" is not confined to
orthodoxy-it extends not only to the Christian church but also to the
Muslim mosque, the Unitarian gathering, and the metaphysical club.
This theological view of religious freedom challenges the church to resist
the political constraints that the state places upon other religious and
even non-religious practices. Williams and Penn embodied similar
views. Both men were among the leading proponents of their day for
respecting the religious and political integrity of Native Americans. And
while they thought Native American religious views and practices
misguided, they did not tolerate them merely instrumentally. The
usually implacable Williams even showed a glimmer of epistemological
humility in his encounter with Native American spirituality: "I find what
I could never hear before, that they have plenty of Gods or divine
powers.""
Williams's and Penn's concern for Native Americans suggests that
the integrity of the church need not come at the cost of ignoring or
marginalizing other religious or nonreligious practices. Yoder and

68. Id. at 287.
69. Id. at 11.
In context, Powell advocates for Christian support of
70. Id. at 291-92.
"majoritarian processes in the United States, at least when policed by [a certain kind of]
limited judicial activism." Id. However, he makes clear that this is a contingent
judgment and that "[a] t other points in history a contrary Christian judgment may have
been appropriate." Id. at 292 n.121. See id. ("During the period of massive resistance to
Brown v. Board of Education, for example, it probably was appropriate to stress judicial
freedom and authority.").
71. 6 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 88 (Perry Miller ed., 2005).
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Hauerwas have made similar claims.n But it might be that affirming the
dignity of others today requires a kind of political engagement beyond

what Yoder and Hauerwas have theorized. Powell suggests that one way
to do so is through the state's legal apparatus. That creates an uneasy
alliance. It mixes forms of dissent with forms of power in ways that risk
distorting teleology and eschatology. But it also gestures toward an
enduring presence that seeks neither to dominate nor to withdraw.
Williams and Penn offer a similar lesson. But theirs is a theological
lesson, and one easily missed by ignoring or misconstruing the context
in which they wrote and lived.

72. See JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE ROYAL PRIESTHOOD: ESSAYS ECCLESIOLOGICAL AND
ECUMENICAL 256 (Michael Cartwright, ed., 1994) ("[Tihe kerygmatic truth claim stands
in no tension with a posture of dialogue that affirms fully the dignity of the

interlocutor."); STANLEY HAUERWAS & ROMAND COLES, CHRISTIANITY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
RADICAL ORDINARY: CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN A RADICAL DEMOCRAT AND A CHRISTIAN
(2007).
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